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Abstract—This article proposes a self-organizing collaborative computing network with an approach to enhance the expectation of a
collaborating node for joining the self-organizing network. The proposed approach relies on Ethereum cryptocurrency and Smart
Contract to enhance the expectation of collaborating nodes by monetizing the services provided to the self-organizing network.
Furthermore, an escrow based smart contract is formalized in the proposed framework to sustains the monetary trust issue between
collaborating nodes. The proposed scheme can enforce an autonomic incentive management mechanism to any type of
self-organizing networks such as self-organizing clouds, ad-hoc networks, self-organizing federated cloud networks, self-organizing
federated learning networks, and self-organizing D2D networks to name a few. Considering the distributed nature of these
self-organizing networks and the Ethereum blockchain network, a distributed agent-based methodology is materialized in the proposed
framework. Following this, a proof of concept implementation for the general case of a self-organizing cloud is presented. Lastly, the
article provides some insights into possible future directions using the proposed framework.
Index Terms—Incentive Management, self-organzing networks, federated networks, ad-hoc networks, D2D, smart contracts,
ethereum.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE technological evolution of computer networks andcomputing devices has enabled a whole new range of
cooperative and collaborative wired/wireless networking
applications [1], [2], [3], [4]. For instance, desktop com-
puters integrating volunteer computing and peer-to-peer
(P2P) networking into cloud architectures anticipating an
architecture of a gigantic self-organizing cloud (SOC) to
reap the huge potential of untapped commodity computing
power over the Internet [5]. In addition to this, we consider
a federated cloud infrastructure, which makes it possible
for a data center to extend its total operational capacity by
subcontracting additional resources from collaborating data
centers, making the infrastructure a federation of Clouds
[6]. In these referenced architectures each participant may
autonomously act as both resource consumer and provider,
and this stands true for ad-hoc networks also. Services built
on top of a centralized architecture may suffer denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks [7], unexpected outages, and limited
pooling of computational resources. On the contrary, fed-
erated computing systems can easily aggregate huge po-
tential computing power to tackle grand challenge science
problems [8]. Furthermore, with the advent of technologies
such as network function virtualization (NFV), virtual net-
work function (VNF), fog computing, and federated learn-
ing the true spirit of self-organizing ubiquitous networked
applications can be anticipated. Given this, self-organizing
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networks (SON) connects a large number of computing
environments by a P2P network, by self-organizing we
assume a network that requires no or minimum human
intervention for sustainability. However, SON suffers from
the problem of the motivation of the resource providers i.e.
the motivation of collaborating resource provider node to
provide their computing services to resource consumers.
In SON, each participating node act either as a resource
provider or a resource consumer. Resource consumers op-
erate autonomously for locating resource provider nodes
offering their desired service/resource over the network
to offload/delegate some of their tasks. Meanwhile, the
resource consumer could utilize multiple resource instances
from other resource providers if required. In this respect,
how a resource provider will be compensated/rewarded
for sharing its computational resources and how resource
consumers will be charged keeping in view the ad-hoc,
self-organizing, and distributed nature of the environments
under the probe. The accounting and billing for the re-
ward and retribution using monetary bills and conventional
banking are un-practical due to the ad-hoc, self-organizing,
and distributed nature of the networks under consideration.
However, the incentives to the resource provider based on
its provisioned resources to the resource consumers in the
network can be materialized by using smart contracts [9]
and decentralized ledger-based crypto-currencies [10].
The motivation factor discussed in the previous para-
graph underpins the focus of this article, wherein we
show how smart contracts, cryptocurrencies, and blockchain
will enable incentive management services for such self-
organizing and federated networks. The overall objective
is to demonstrate the practicality of the proposed agent-
based framework through the use of smart contracts and
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decentralized ledger-based crypto-currency. Smart contracts
can debit and credit crypto-wallets of the resource providers
and consumers based on programmed events and functions
which reside in the contract. Through this method, a smart
contract will be debited from the resource consumer crypto-
currency wallet for the consumption of services/resources
according to the valuations. Likewise, the crypto-currency
wallet of a resource provider will be debited by the smart
contract for the services/resources provided by the provider
to the consumer in the network. More particularly through
the blockchain, we ensure that the incentive management
service has the attributes of consensus, provenance, own-
ership, immutability, finality, and access control attributes.
The proposed scheme represents an important solution for
improving the motivation of a resource provider node to
join an ad-hoc, federated, and self-organizing environment
and maintain itself in the environment and ensuring fair
incentive rewards and retribution.
The remainder of this article is organized as section 2
presents the related work. Section 3 details the proposed
framework. Section 4 presents the proof of concept imple-
mentation details. Lastly, section 5 concludes the article with
future directions.
2 RELATED WORK
Research on volunteer distributed computing models is
multifaceted ranging from volunteer computing architec-
tures [5], [11], [12], resource discovery [13], [14], resource al-
location [15], [16], security [17], incentive management [18].
Edinger et. al [19] studies the effect of monetary incentives
in P2P and volunteer computing models using conceptual
and practical implications. Edinger et. al finds monetary
incentives can enhance the intrinsic motivation to share
resources when sharing takes place amongst anonymous
users. However, keeping in view the distributed nature
of volunteer computing blockchain-based crypto-currency
[20] becomes a de-facto choice for the authors based on
Edinger et. al hypothesis while considering the distributed
and anonymous nature of Blockchain along with consensus,
provenance, ownership, immutability, finality, access control
attributes, and most importantly market value.
Based on this literature review the research gap was
obvious to utilize blockchain-based cryptocurrencies in vol-
unteer computing models to enhance the motivation for
resource sharing in the volunteer overlay. In this regard,
we conceptualize ”SmartSON: A Smart contract-driven in-
centive management framework for Self-Organizing Net-
works”. SmartSON is a generalized blockchain-powered
agent-based self-organizing network model for volunteer
computing.
3 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
We begin by describing, and giving intuition about the
incentive management mechanism based on escrow, smart
contract, and crypto-currencies for self-organizing networks
in section 3.1. The rest of the sections presents the re-
maining three participants in the proposed framework i.e.
the Authority Node, the Resource Consumers, and the Re-
source Providers. The smart contract resides in the ethereum
crypto-currency network, while the rest are the conceptu-
al/physical entities in the self-organizing network. These
entities are sometimes referred to as nodes that are equipped
with specialized software agents, these Agents follow the
complete Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA)
specification [21], for distributed heterogeneous agent man-
agement and communication. These agents interact with
users and with other agents available in the network to
construct the self-organizing overlay network over the un-
derlying network, enabling a distributed agent platform
according to the FIPA specifications [22]. Figure 1 present
the abstract bird-eye view of the envisioned self-organizing
network, followed by the details and specification of each
node in the forth-coming subsections.
Fig. 1. Abstract bird-eye view of the envisioned self-organizing network.
3.1 Incentive management mechanism based on es-
crow and smart contract
3.1.1 Escrow
Escrow is generally considered as an agreement of trust
among two stakeholders formalizing a business service deal
among one another by incorporating a trusted third party
mediator in-between. Conventionally, escrows conducted
by the administrative involvement of a trustee third-party
which is responsible for making sure non of the stakeholders
tangled in the business deal is defaulting. The resource n
service consumers or generally buyer deposits a negotiated
amount of money in the escrow and demands the service to
be done in a given time. The resource n service provider or
seller is notified of the deal and the along with a schedule
time period complying the service needs to be performed
in that amount of time. Thus, the seller is duty-bound for
completing the service within the negotiated time for the
negotiated charge at an acceptable quality. During the entire
service time period, it is the guaranteed responsibility of
the trusted third-party to ensure the security of the money.
Once the seller completely performs the service and lets
the trusted third-party escrow know the status of the deal.
Next, it is the responsibility of the service consumer to
approve/disapprove the service performed by the seller
before the stipulated contract period ends. If the service
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performed is approved by the service consumer, the trusted
third-party escrow will pay out the deposited money to the
seller keeping a pre-decided percentage of the money as
an escrow fee charge. If the service is done is disapproved
by the service consumer, the escrow will hold the money
unless a decision is taken by either of the stakeholders (the
seller improves the quality of service / both the stakeholders
decides not to go forward with the deal). Otherwise, at a
time when an ongoing escrow has not ended, there might
be a case that the seller does not want to go further with the
contract; then the seller requests a cancellation of the escrow.
This awaits cancellation confirmation from the service con-
sumer upon whose positive response the trusted third-party
escrow contract is canceled and the money deposited in the
escrow is returned back to the service consumer keeping
the pre-decided percentage of the money as the escrow fee
charge. If the seller is unable to complete the service in the
given time period, the deposited money is transferred back
to the service consumer with the escrow fee being charged.
Keeping the escrows model in view and framing
it upon the incentive problem in self-organizing
networks where it is possible for a resource con-
sumer to extends its total operational capacity by
subcontracting additional resources from resource
providers making the federation incentive-driven.
3.1.2 Trust Issues of Escrows with the proposed model
The entrusted third-party intended to be the custodian
for the escrow might not be honest - result in scenarios
of unwanted troubles, contract manipulations, theft, and
collusion.
If any of the stakeholders is not truthful in the deal - and
might result in locking up of ones money in the escrow until
the issue is resolved by involvement of legal authority.
Now here in our formalized self-organizing network, we
ignore the case of physical escrow, as the scale of networks
grows the physical escrows seem to be impractical for a two-
node network.
3.1.3 Blokchain Powered Decentralised Escrows
Decentralized escrow refers to an escrow whose operations
are not controlled by a trusted third-party, rather being
transparent enough to be visible to everyone or intended
to visible to everyone in the blockchain network. Ethereum
[10] is such a decentralized blockchain network that allows
transactions to be carried out between any two stakeholders
without the need for a centralized third-party intermediary
[10]. In addition, unlike Nakamoto’s Bitcoin blockchain
network [23], Ethereum network provision the execution
of code powered by gas. Hence, originating the concept of
smart contracts that is a job-specific code written to ensure a
particular job is performed in a decentralized constellation
without the involvement of an intermediate trusted third-
party.
Consequently, escrows can be modeled into fitting use-
case of a blockchain-powered decentralized network to
perform transactions. The central idea is to utilize smart
contract for taking care of the security deposit and prevent
the business stakeholders to default. Escrow over ethereum
makes sure the service consumers money is not fiddled
with, the seller gets the resource/service charge he de-
mands, and the service consumer gets the resource/service
he demands. This guarantee will ensure an incentive for the
resource/service providers to be part of the self-organizing
network and provide services to the network while compen-
sating for the services being offered to the network.
3.1.4 Escrow over Ethereum Smart Contract
The escrow smart contract is presented as Appendix A . The
escrow smart contract is owned by an escrow owner (au-
thority node) who is the one who creates the contract, for-
malized in the smart contract constructor. Theres a variable
EscrowStatus that provides and tracks the current status of
the escrow which will be set to unInitialized by default.
The escrow owner will initialize the contract for the
two stakeholders i.e. a resource consumer and a resource
provider by calling the Initialize() function of the contract
while passing consumer address, provider address, fee per-
centage, and a final block number denoting the service time
deadline. The EscrowStatus is set to initialized after the
initialization step. Its ensured that none of the addresses
of the consumer or provider is equal to that of the escrow
owner/authority node.
Once the escrow is initialized, the resource consumer
can make any number of deposits to the contract using De-
positInEscrowByConsumer() contract function calls which
emit events for the same. Note that, the money deposited
is owned by the contract and the escrow owner has no
control over it, solving the problem of trust aroused due
to dishonest third-party. After the deposit, the EscrowStatus
will now hold the status of consumerDeposited.
The service time passes are measured as transactions
take place in the network, and the latest block number
increases a service time epoch passes. Once the service is
provisioned by the resource provider before the latest block
number exceeds the given block number limit, the resource
provider approves the escrow and marks the resource pro-
visioning by him to complete.
The resource consumer next holds the resource up-til
the leased time, and relinquish the resource to the resource
provider after utilizing it. In case the service quality is
acceptable, the escrow is approved by the resource con-
sumer. Since both the consumer and provider have ap-
proved the escrow, EscrowStatus now changes to serviceAp-
proved state. Next, the smart contract automatically initiates
payment of fee charged to the escrow owner a value which
is decided by the fee percentage. Next, the smart contract
automatically initiates the payment of the remaining balance
amount to the resource provider address. At this point, the
EscrowStatus is now changed to escrowComplete.
In case the service quality is not acceptable, the re-
source consumer does not approve of the service. After
further negotiation with the resource provider, the resource
provider can re-provision or decide to cancel the escrow.
If the consumer too cancels the escrow, the entire amount
of money deposited into the escrow will be refunded back
to the consumer with the escrow owner keeping a pre-
decided amount of sum as escrow fee charge. At this point,
the EscrowStatus is changed to escowCancelled. After this,
the escrow is now in steady-state and is ready to conduct
another escrow.
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Lastly, the escrow can be ended only by escrow owner
so that the contract is destructed.
3.2 Authority Node
We start our discussion on the working and internal of the
proposed framework from the authority node because of the
fact it is central to the working and understanding of the
whole concept and mechanism of the proposed framework.
The component diagram of the authority node is presented
in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Component diagram of authority node
The FIPA specifications state that a distributed multi-
agent should have an Agent Management System (AMS)
and a Directory Facilitator (DF) agent. The AMS agent rep-
resents the authority in the platform and has been tasked to
control the distributed multi-agent platform and responsible
for registering and destroying agents in the distributed
agent platform and stopping the platform. Furthermore, the
DF agent provides a directory that announces which agents
are available on the platform, simply DF is a node lookup
service. Due to these functionalities, it makes sense in our
proposed framework the AMS and DF agents are kept on
the authority node. Furthermore, multiple authority nodes
can be made available to mitigate for the single-point of
failure for a single authority node.
The contract registrar agent in the authority node is
responsible for creating the escrow smart contract over the
ethereum network, and the core of the business model of
incentives anticipated through the proposed framework.
The communication between the contract registrar agent
and the ethereum network will be facilitated through a
Wallet console connected to the ethereum network. The
escrow smart contract between the resource consumer and
the resource provider will be initialized by the contract reg-
istrar and on completion of a service transaction, the crypto-
currency amount escrowed by the resource consumer node
will be transferred into the resource provider wallet, along
with a contract fee deducted and debited into the authority
node account. The contract will be owned by the authority
node to effectively imitate the physical escrow model and
facilitate in arbitration and transaction rollbacks. The cyclic
behavior according to the FIPA specification of the contract
registrar agent is provided as Algorithm 1. The working of
this behavior should be studied in conjunction with section
3.3.2. Furthermore, the ethereum Smart Contract is provided
as a supplementary attachment to this manuscript.
Algorithm 1 Contract Server
Input: Wallet, ContractFee
Output: (BlockNo,TransactionHash)
1: Message msg = ReceieveMessage()
2: (ProviderAddress, ConsumerAddress, Deadline)
=msg.getContent()
3: Web3 = Connect to the Ethereum Network.
4: Contract = Create Contract Instance;
5: ContractAddress = Web3.deployContract(Contract,Wallet)
6: if ContractAddress 6= ∅ then
7: params = {ProviderAddress, ConsumerAddress, Con-
tractFee, Deadline}
8: Web3.callContractFunction(ContractAddress,
”initEscrow”, params, Wallet)
9: (BlockNo,TransactionHash) = WaitForTransactionToBe-
Mined()
10: Message response = CreateMessage(msg.getSender,
FIPA.CONFIRM)
11: response.setContent(ContractAddress)
12: SendMessage(response)
13: else
14: Message response = CreateMessage(msg.getSender,
FIPA.CANCEL)
15: response.setContent(ContractAddress)
16: SendMessage(response)
17: end if
18: return (BlockNo, TransactionHash)
The contract server behavior presented in Algorithm
1 will execute cyclically until the lifespan of the contract
registrar agent. The algorithm takes two inputs one is the
ethereum wallet credentials, and the second one is the con-
tract fee. The wallet credentials are used for interaction with
the ethereum blockchain network. Line 1 of the algorithm
opts to receive a FIPA request performative message from a
resource consumer through the agent platform for contract
initiation. The FIPA performative for agent communication
is standardized as FIPA agent communication language
message structure specification [24]. Line 2 extracts the mes-
sage payload containing 3-tuple i.e., two ethereum network
account addresses, and a contract initiation deadline. One of
the received address is the address of a resource provider,
while the second received address is the ethereum address
of the resource consumer from which the message at Line 1
is received. Line 3 will allow the contract server to connect
to the ethereum network required for deploying of the
escrow smart contract and further interaction with the smart
contract. Line 4 creates an instance of the escrow smart
contract to push the contract into the ethereum network.
Line 5 deploys the escrow smart contract on the ethereum
network and will return the address of the contract. Line
5 is a blocking call and will return once the contract de-
ployment transaction is mined in a block in the ethereum
blockchain. Furthermore, the contract deployed in Line 5
will be in the ownership of the authority node to support
the purposed business model through contract fee from the
final transaction, and also to facilitates arbitration between
the resource consumer or the resource provider due to
their natural rationality. Line 6 will check whether there
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is a contract address available to be sent to the requesting
resource consumer. Line 7, initializes a parameter array that
needs to be passed to the escrow smart contract initiation
function. Line 8 uses the ethereum network interface to
call the escrow initialization function of the resident escrow
smart contract available at the address received on Line 5.
Line 9, waits for the contract function call to be mined in the
ethereum blockchain. Line 10-12 creates and sends a FIPA’s
confirm performative message to the resource consumer
who requested the contract. If Line 6, yields false, meaning
there is no contract address available i.e. the deployment
of the contract is failed, then Line 14-16 creates and sends a
FIPA’s cancel performative message to inform the requesting
resource consumer that the request can not be handled.
3.3 Resource Consumers
The resource consumers are the lifeline behind the pro-
posed business model. Resource consumers feed the re-
source providers and the authority nodes with the ethereum
crypto-currency upon consuming a service/resource. The
resource consumers in the case of a SOC will be a peer
desktop computer node connected to internet consuming re-
sources/services from other peer desktop computing node
in the SOC network. In the case of federated cloud, a
resource consumer is a data center/cloud service provider
wishing to extend its total operational capacity by subcon-
tracting additional resources from collaborating resources
providing data centers. Similarly, in the case of ad-hoc/D2D
networks, a resource consumer is a device wishing to extend
its computer or communication capacity by using other
resource provider devices in the network. The component
diagram of a resource consumer is presented in Figure 3.
The resource consumer is equipped with a FIPA compliant
consumer agent, a resource interaction interface, and an
ethereum wallet connected to the ethereum network. The
consumer agent interacts with the ethereum network and
ethereum escrow smart contract using the wallet connected
to the ethereum network. The resource interaction interface
is the northbound interface to the end-user or other software
agents/systems if any, used for interacting with the resource
acquired from the self-organizing network.
Fig. 3. Component diagram of Resource Consumer
The consumer agent in the resource consumer nodes
implement the following FIPA complaint agent behaviors
to affirm the proper incentive management protocol in the
proposed framework:
3.3.1 Request Resource Behavior
‘ Request resource behavior performs the service/resource
request function and interaction with all the resource
provider to find the best match resource/service in the
self-organizing network. The request resource behavior is
presented as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Request Resource Behavior
Input: TargetResource
Output: (BestResource, BestProvider)
1: array ProviderList = DFService.findAll(”resource-
provider”)
2: Message msg = CreateMessage(FIPA.CFP)
3: msg.setContent(TargetResource)
4: SendMessage(ProviderList,msg)
5: NoOfReplies=0, BestScore=0
6: BestProvider=∅, BestResource=∅
7: while NoOfReplies < ProviderList.length do
8: Message response = ReceieveMessage(”PROPOSE”)
9: (MatchScore,OfferredResource) = response.getContent()
10: ifMatchScore > BestScore then
11: BestScore = MatchScore
12: BestProvider = response.getSender()
13: BestResource = OfferredResource
14: end if
15: NoOfReplies++
16: end while
17: return (BestResource,BestProvider)
This behavior presented as Algorithm 2 will be exe-
cuted once an end-user i.e. a resource consumer triggers
its execution and provides a target resource required. The
required resource is abstracted as a resource vector in the
form of TargetResource :< s1, s2, ...si >, where s1...si,
is the specification of the required resource. According to
the specified target resource the Algorithm 2 starts with
Line 1 by requesting the directory facilitation service to
provide the list of resource providers who have registered
a ”resource-provider” service description with the agent
platform. Line 2-4 of Algorithm 2, creates and sends a
FIPA’s call for proposal performative message to resource
providers. The message is encapsulated with the required
resource vector. Line 5-6 initializes some status variables to
track the ”propose” FIPA performative message responses
from the resource providers to find the best match for the
resource requested by the consumer. The while loop at Line
7, will remain true until and unless the response from all the
resource providers is not received. Line 8-15, provides the
implementation to select the best match resource from all
of the resource providers. The match score is the similarity
score between the requested resources and the resource
available with the resource provider (this functionality is
explained in section 3.4.1 in detail). A resource provider will
send his best-matched resource to the consumer, which is
received here at the consumer on Line 8 of this algorithm.
The if statement and its body starting from Line 10, allow
this consumer to select the best resource available from all of
the resource providers. Finally, the behavior returns the best
resource hosted by a resource provider in the network. This
returned output will be fed into forth mentioned consumer
agent behaviors.
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3.3.2 Contract Behavior
Contract Behavior is responsible to communicate with the
contract registrar agent residing in the authority node to
start an escrow smart contract with the resource provider.
This resource consumer’s contract behavior is presented as
Algorithm 3. The working of this behavior can be better
understood in conjunction with contract server behavior
presented as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 3 Contract Behavior
Input: BestResource, BestProviderAddress, Dead-
line,LeaseTime, Wallet
Output: (BlockNo,TransactionHash)
1: Message msg = CreateMessage(FIPA.REQUEST)
2: msg.setContent(BestProviderAddress,MyAddress,Deadline)
3: SendMessage(AuthorityNode.ContractRegistrarAgent,msg)
4: Message response = ReceieveMessage()
5: if response.checkPerformative(”CONFIRM”)
response.getContent() 6= ∅ then
6: ContractAddress = response.getContent()
7: Web3 = Connect to the Ethereum Network.
8: depositAmount = LeaseTime × BestResource.price
9: params = {depositAmount}
10: Web3.callContractFunction(ContractAddress, ”deposit-
ToEscrow”, params, Wallet)
11: (BlockNo,TransactionHash) = WaitForTransactionToBe-
Mined()
12: if BlockNo, TransactionHash 6= ∅ then
13: return (BlockNo, TransactionHash,ContractAddress)
14: end if
15: return ∅
16: end if
This contract behavior presented as Algorithm 3 will
be executed by the resource consumer agent automatically
once it received the best resource and the resource provider
address from the request resource behavior i.e. Algorithm
2. Consequently, lines 1-3 of this contract behavior send
these details of a resource provider address, the address of
this resource consumer, and a contract initiating deadline
to the contract registrar agent residing on the authority
node. The deadline is programmed in the smart contract
to ensure the contract can only be made and initialized in a
qualified time-interval specified by the resource consumer.
These escrow smart contract initialization parameters sent
by this contract behavior is received on line 2 and utilized at
line 8 of the Algorithm 1. Furthermore, lines 10-11 at Algo-
rithm 1 of the contract server behavior sends the ethereum
public address of the smart contract which was here at
this behavior received at line 4. The if statement on line
5 tests whether a contract address is received by checking
the confirm message performative, if no contract address is
being sent from the Algorithm 1 this behavior will return
null, specified as the else clause at line 13-14. Line 6-10 of
this contract behavior handles the received contract address,
to deposit ethereum crypto-currency into the escrow smart
contract residing over the received contract address in the
ethereum network. The deposit amount depends upon the
valuation of the best resource, along-with the resource lease
time that is provided as input to this behavior. The lease
time and deadline are provided by the end-user, or it can be
fixed depending upon the application. Once the transaction
at line no. 10 is mined, line 11 will receive the block no
and the transaction hash of the mined block and return it
to the consumer agent for further usage in the next coming
behavior.
3.3.3 Acquire Resource Behavior
Acquire resource behavior is responsible to communicate
with the resource provider from which the best resource
was selected in Algorithm 2. This acquire resource behavior
is presented as Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Acquire Resource Behavior
Input: BestResource, BestProvider, ContractAddress, Lease-
Time
Output: Resource Interface Details
1: Message msg = CreateMes-
sage(FIPA.ACCEPT PROPOSAL)
2: msg.setContent(BestResource, ContractAddress,
LeaseTime)
3: SendMessage(BestProvider,msg)
4: Message response = ReceieveMessage()
5: if response.checkPerformative(”INFORM”) then
6: return (ResourceInterfaceDetails)
7: else
8: return ∅
9: end if
Once the consumer agent receives a valid contract ad-
dress by executing the contract behavior (Algorithm 3), this
acquire resource behavior will be executed. This behavior
takes two input variables i.e. BestResource,BestProvider
returned by Algorithm 2, one user-provided inputs
LeaseT ime, and a ContractAddress returned by Algo-
rithm 3 . This acquire resource behavior informs the selected
resource provider about the escrow deposit made into the
escrow contract. Line 1-3, convey this information to the
selected resource provider, by sending a FIPA’s accept pro-
posal performative message accepting the proposal sent by
the resource provider and received at line 8 of Algorithm 2.
The resource provider will check the deposit amount based
on the leased time and the stipulated price of the resource
under the escrow smart contract. If the escrow amount is
available in the contract account, the resource provider will
provide the resource interface to this resource consumer
using a FIPA inform performative. Line 5-6 handles this
message to be provisioned to the end-user.
Once the user receives the resource interface details the
lease time timer will start after a time threshold. Note that
this is a proof of concept paper, this lease time timer is
created to imitate the time event on which the resource
release behavior can be triggered.
3.3.4 Release Resource Behavior
Release resource behavior is responsible to release the re-
source and interact with the escrow smart contract to release
the balance into the resource provider account. Once the
lease timer expires Algorithm 5 will be called in automati-
cally.
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Algorithm 5 Release Resource Behavior
Input: Resource, Provider, ContractAddress, Wallet
Output: null
1: Web3 = Connect to the Ethereum Network.
2: Web3.callContractFunction(ContractAddress, ”approveE-
scrow”, null, Wallet)
3: Message msg = CreateMessage(FIPA.DISCONFIRM)
4: msg.setContent(Resource)
5: SendMessage(Provider,msg)
This release resource behavior takes four input vari-
ables i.e. Resource, Provider, ContractAddress,Wallet.
Resource represents the resource that needs to be released,
Provider is the provider from which the resource was
leased, ContractAddress is the address of the escrow smart
contract, and Wallet is the ethereum wallet credentials
of the consumer. Line 1-2 of Algorithm 5 approves the
escrow so that funds should be released to the resource
provider. Line 3-5, inform the resource provider about the
disengagement.
3.4 Resource Providers
The resource providers are the driving force behind the
proposed business model. Resource providers provides its
available resources from the resource pool to the resource
consumers in the self-organizing overlay. The resource
providers in the case of a SOC will be a peer desktop
computer node connected to internet providing virtual re-
sources/services to other peer desktop computing nodes
i.e. resource consumers in the SOC network. In the case of
federated cloud, a resource provider is a data center/cloud
service provider wishing to minimizes its total operational
cost by providing its available un-utilized resources to col-
laborating resources consuming data centers. Similarly, in
the case of ad-hoc/D2D networks, a resource provider is a
device wishing to provides its computer or communication
capacity to be utilized by resource consumers devices in the
network. As earlier mentioned in section 2 Edinger et. al [19]
hypothesizes ”monetary incentives can enhance the intrinsic
motivation for resource providers to share resources when
sharing takes place amongst anonymous users”. Following
this, blockchain based crypto-currency [20] is a choice hav-
ing a market value for the resource providers to enhance
their motivation.
The component diagram of a resource provider is pre-
sented in Figure 4. The resource provider is equipped with
a FIPA compliant provider agent, a resource provision in-
terface, a resource pool from which resources are offered
on per use basis, and an ethereum wallet connected to
the ethereum network. The provider agent interacts with
the ethereum network and ethereum escrow smart contract
using the wallet connected to the ethereum network. The
resource provision interface is the northbound interface to
the resource interaction interface of the resource consumers
or any other software agents/systems if any, used by the re-
source consumers for interacting with the resource acquired
from the self-organizing network.
Fig. 4. Component diagram of Resource Providers
The providers agent in the resource provider nodes
implement the following FIPA complaint agent behaviors
to affirm the proper incentive management protocol in the
proposed framework:
3.4.1 Request Handle Behavior
This request handle behavior is cyclic and is continuously
running to accept resource request from the resource con-
sumers. The behavior is initialized when the provider agent
starts up. The request handle behavior is presented as Algo-
rithm 6. Algorithm 6 listens for the CFP messages from the
resource consumers request resource behavior presented as
Algorithm 2 and respond it accordingly.
Algorithm 6 Request Handle Behavior
Input: catalogue
Output: null
1: Message msg = ReceiveMessage();
2: if msg.checkPerformative(”CFP”) then
3: requestedResource = msg.getContentObject();
4: bestMatch = null;
5: bestSimilarityScore = 0.0
6: currentSimilarityScore = 0.0
7: ResourcesList = catalogue;
8: for each res in ResourcesList do
9: currentSimilarityScore = CosineSimilar-
ity(requestedResource, res)
10: if currentSimilarityScore > bestSimilarityScore
then
11: bestSimilarityScore = currentSimilarityScore
12: bestMatch = res
13: end if
14: end for
15: if bestMatch != null then
16: reply = msg.createReply();
17: reply.setPerformative(PROPOSE);
18: reply.setContentObject(bestMatch);
19: else
20: reply = msg.createReply();
21: reply.setPerformative(REFUSE);
22: reply.setContent(”not-available”);
23: end if
24: SendMessage(reply);
25: else
26: Do Nothing
27: end if
Algorithm 6 takes as an input the resource catalog the
resource provider is offering right now. The catalog is
essentially a list of resources ( a resource is represented
NETWORKING LAB, KYUNG HEE UNIVERSITY, AUG 2020 8
as a row vector as mentioned in section 3.3.1). Line 1 of
Algorithm 6 opts to receive a message and check its FIPA’s
CFP performative in Line 2. Line 3 extracts the requested
resource vector sent by a resource consumer. Line 4-7,
initialize some status variables to lookup for the best match-
ing resource in the resource catalog against the requested
resource received in Line 3. The loop at line 8-14 calculates
the cosine similarity score between the requested resource
and a resource from the resource catalog in every iteration
and records the best-matched resource and its score in Line
10-13. Line 9 uses cosine similarity for comparing the two
resource vectors, and is defined as follows:
cos(t, e) =
te
‖t‖‖e‖ =
∑n
i=1 tiei√∑n
i=1 (ti)
2
√∑n
i=1 (ei)
2
(1)
Where t and e are resource vector in the form of<
s1, s2, ...sn >, where s1...sn, is the specification of the
resource. The use of similarity function makes things simple
and realistic as every resource provider will have to use the
same similarity function. Furthermore, one can argue why
not to use the price as the matching criteria, price is just one
factor in the resource vector there are other resource speci-
fication involved which should also need to be included in
the best match decision and cosine similarity seems good
for such type of row vector comparisons. Line 15-18 will
check and prepare a message containing the best-matched
resource specifications using a FIPA’s propose performative
to the resource consumer which requested the resource. The
else statement of Line 19-22 prepares a message using a
FIPA’s refuse performative to the resource consumer which
requested the resource to specify the refusal of the request.
Line 24 sends this response message for both the cases.
The propose performative sent by the resource provider is
handled at Algorithm 2 line 8-15 of the resource consumer.
3.4.2 Lease Resource Behavior
This lease resource behavior just like the previous behavior
is cyclic and is continuously running for responding to the
proposals sent by the resource consumers in response to the
proposals sent by the request handle behavior in Algorithm
6. The lease resource behavior is presented as Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 takes input an ethereum wallet information
and two data structures from the resource provider agent
one is the resource catalog and the second one is the
consumer resource map to record the resource lease. Line 1
receives a message from resource consumers. Line 2 checks
for an accept proposals FIPA’s performative message which
is sent by Algorithm 4 of the resource consumer. Line 3,
extracts the information about the resource which needs to
be leased to the requesting resource consumer. Line 4 gets
this resource from the resource catalog. Line 5 will check
whether the resource was successfully popped from the
resource pool, otherwise due to any reasons the resource is
unavailable in the catalog a FIPA failure performative mes-
sage is prepared and sent to the resource consumer in Line
17-20. Line 6 puts the record of the lease in key-value map
specifying which consumer has taken which resource. Line
7, gets the ethereum contract address of the smart contract in
which the escrow amount is being deposited by the resource
consumer. Line 8-11 connects with the ethereum wallet and
approves the escrow enabling the contract. Line 12 -15 will
send a FIPA’s inform performative message enclosing the
resource interaction details addressed toward the requesting
resource consumer.
Algorithm 7 Lease Resource Behavior
Input: catalogue, ConsumerResourceMap, Wallet
Output: null
1: Message msg = ReceiveMessage();
2: if msg.checkPerformative(”ACCEPT PROPOSAL”) then
3: requestedResource = msg.getContentObject();
4: poppedResource = cata-
logue.remove(requestedResource);
5: if poppedResource != null then
6: ConsumerResourceMap.put(msg.getSender(), poppe-
dResource);
7: contractAddress = requeste-
dResource.getContractAddress();
8: Web3 = Connect to the Ethereum Network.
9: params = {}
10: Web3.callContractFunction(contractAddress,
”approveEscrow”, params, Wallet)
11: (BlockNo,TransactionHash) = WaitForTransaction-
ToBeMined()
12: Message reply = msg.createReply();
13: reply.setPerformative(INFORM);
14: reply.setContent(”Resource Interaction Details”);
15: SendMessage(reply);
16: else
17: Message reply = msg.createReply();
18: reply.setPerformative(FAILURE);
19: reply.setContent(”not-available”);
20: SendMessage(reply);
21: end if
22: else
23: Do Nothing
24: end if
3.4.3 Release Resource Behavior
This release resource behavior is the resource provider ver-
sion of the releasing resource which works according to the
perspective of the resource provider and will interact with
the resource consumer resource release behavior presented
in section 3.3.4. The resource provider release resource be-
havior is presented as Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8 takes the catalog and consumer resource
map as parameters. Line 1 reads a message from a resource
consumer through the underlying message platform. Line
2 checks for a FIPA’s disconfirm performative. If not suc-
cessful will prepare and send a FIPA failure performative
message in Line 11-14. If line 2 yields true then, line 3 will
extract the information of the resource that a resource con-
sumer wants to release. Line 4, will verify there is a resource
that needs to be released. Line 5, create a reply message
template for the requesting resource consumer. Line 6 puts
the resource back in the catalog, making it available to other
resource consumers to lease it. Line 7, remove the lease
record maintained by the resource provider agent. Line 8
set the reply message performative to FIPA’s disconfirm
to tell the requesting resource consumer agent about the
dis-engagement. Line 9 finally sends the message to the
requesting resource consumer.
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Algorithm 8 Release Resource Behavior
Input: catalogue, ConsumerResourceMap
Output: null
1: Message msg = ReceiveMessage();
2: if msg.checkPerformative(”DISCONFIRM”) then
3: releasedResource = msg.getContentObject();
4: if releasedResource != null then
5: Message reply = msg.createReply();
6: catalogue.put(releasedResource.getResourceName(),
releasedResource);
7: ConsumerResourceMap.remove(msg.getSender(), re-
leasedResource);
8: reply.setPerformative(DISCONFIRM);
9: SendMessage(reply);
10: else
11: Message reply = msg.createReply();
12: reply.setPerformative(FAILURE);
13: reply.setContent(”not-available”);
14: SendMessage(reply);
15: end if
16: else
17: Do Nothing
18: end if
4 PROOF OF CONCEPT
For the proof of concept of the proposed framework, we
developed a simulated testbed and utilize off the shelf tech-
nologies to conceptualize the Ethereum blockchain-powered
incentive management solution for a self-organizing cloud.
Figure 5 presents the topology of the proposed implemen-
tation along with the component details of each of the
nodes. This proof of concept emulates the self-organizing
cloud environment where desktop computers integrating
volunteer computing and peer-to-peer (P2P) networking
into cloud architectures anticipating an architecture of a
gigantic self-organizing cloud (SOC) to reap the huge po-
tential of untapped commodity computing power over the
Internet [5]. Figure 5 clearly presents the resource providers
agents interacting with the on-device VMM to trade and
provider virtual resources to the resource consumers in the
self-organizing network.
The proposed framework was formalized using agent-
based methodologies, ethereum blockchain smart contracts,
and cryptocurrency. The agent methodologies is incorpo-
rated by using the java agent development framework
(JADE) [25] 1. JADE serves as a building block for the
proposed framework implementation. JADE is fully imple-
mented in the Java language which also implies that our
proposed framework proof of concept implementation is
also fully in Java language. JADE simplifies the implemen-
tation of multi-agent systems through a middle-ware that
complies with the FIPA specifications and through a set of
tools that support the debugging and deployment phases.
A JADE-based system can be distributed across machines
(which does not even need to share the same OS) and the
configuration can be controlled making JADE perfect for
implementing a self-organizing system. The configuration
can be even changed at run-time by moving agents from
one machine to another, as and when required. Lastly, we
have configured our own private ethereum test net in order
to verify the proposed framework.
1. https://jade.tilab.com/
TABLE 1
Trace File for resource providers
Title Wei/hr MIPS2 $ /GB RAM BW (MBPS) CPU Cores
t3a.nano 0.0047 4744 0.284 0.5 18 2
t3.nano 0.0052 7500 0.276 0.5 82 2
t2.nano 0.0058 8800 0.32 0.5 44 1
t3a.micro 0.0094 9900 0.352 1 4 2
t3.micro 0.0104 10000 0.096 1 66 2
t2.micro 0.0116 10240 0.116 1 31 1
t3a.small 0.0188 13800 0.044 2 59 2
t3.small 0.0208 14000 0.092 2 55 2
t2.small 0.023 18938 0.036 2 12 1
a1.medium 0.0255 19200 0.26 2 40 1
t3a.medium 0.0376 27079 0.12 4 35 2
t3.medium 0.0416 42820 0.268 4 68 2
t2.medium 0.0464 49161 0.064 4 23 2
a1.large 0.051 49360 0.284 4 100 2
t3a.large 0.0752 53840 0.04 8 23 2
t3.large 0.0832 59455 0.28 8 24 2
m5a.large 0.086 65770 0.008 8 57 2
t2.large 0.0928 71120 0.172 8 12 2
m5.large 0.096 78440 0.04 8 96 2
m4.large 0.1 82300 0.4 8 79 2
a1.xlarge 0.102 83000 0.12 8 54 4
m5ad.large 0.103 90749 0.048 8 93 2
m5d.large 0.113 92100 0.256 8 44 2
m5n.large 0.119 97125 0.332 8 99 2
m5dn.large 0.136 106924 0.204 8 99 2
t3a.xlarge 0.1504 113093 0.216 16 69 4
t3.xlarge 0.1664 115625 0.036 16 95 4
m5a.xlarge 0.172 117160 0.236 16 10 4
t2.xlarge 0.1856 133740 0.368 16 9 4
m5.xlarge 0.192 147600 0.164 16 72 4
m4.xlarge 0.2 176170 0.06 16 10 4
a1.2xlarge 0.204 238310 0.4 16 68 8
m5ad.xlarge 0.206 304510 0.324 16 88 4
m5d.xlarge 0.226 317900 0.38 16 93 4
4.1 Experimental Setup
The proof of concept implementation is performed on an
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU @ 3.60GHz having 16 GB
RAM configured with Ubuntu 18.04 LTS OS. The ethereum
test-net was created using Go Ethereum blockchain im-
plementation. The proposed framework primarily focused
on solving the incentive problems in order to motivate
nodes to join the self-organizing network and provide their
resources to the network. The motivation was increased by
monetizing the resource offered by the resource providers
using the ethereum smart contract and cryptocurrency. In
order to achieve this, the resource providers and consumers
are simulated through software agents implemented using
JADE to provide a resource and consume a resource. These
software agents can readily be plugged in a physical testbed
all because of the JADE middle-ware.
4.2 Resource Providers Agents View
The resource provider agent when it starts-up loads five
random resources from a resource trace file presented as
Table 1. These five resources will be added to the resource
pool of the resource providers and once a request from a
resource consumer reaches the resource provider the request
is matched with these resources available in the resource
pool.
The resource provider agent once loaded look like Figure
6. The upper grid in Figure 6 represents the resources
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Fig. 5. Topology and Component Details of Proof of Concept Implementation
available in the resource pool which can be offered to the
consumers in the self-organizing network. The lower grid
in the GUI of the resource provider agents presents the
resources that are currently being leased to the consumers.
Besides this visual look out of the resource provider agent,
the resource provider agent also has an ethereum wallet that
is loaded from an Ethereum blockchain crypto JSON wallet
key-store file. This wallet credential in the key-store file will
represent the resource provider in the ethereum network
and is used by the software agent to interface with the
ethereum network, and the escrow smart contract. All the
transactions will be channeled into the account specified in
the key-store file.
4.3 Resource Consumer Agents View
The resource consumer agent when starts-up loads a ran-
dom resource from the resource trace file presented as Table
1. This resource would serve as the requesting resource from
the self-organizing network. Figure 7 represents the GUI
of the resource consumer agent with configurable resource
specifications, or you can just generate a random request
from the trace file. Figure 7 also presents the list of active
providers from which the resource can be bought upon
finding the best match using cosine distance as mentioned in
section 3.4.1. The list of active providers is published by the
directory facilitator agent residing on the authority node.
Fig. 6. Resource Provider Agent GUI View
Similarly, like the resource provider agent, the resource
consumer agent also has an ethereum wallet that is loaded
from an Ethereum blockchain crypto JSON wallet key-store
file to interface with the ethereum network, and the escrow
smart contract. The per usage price of the resource will be
deducted from the specified ethereum wallet. A Resource
consumer can buy as many resources from the network
as needed or a policy implementation can be made upon
the type of self-organizing network the framework is being
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Fig. 7. Resource Consumer Agent GUI View
used.
4.4 Contract Registrar Agent View
The contract registrar agent resides on the authority node.
Contract registrar agent the core of the business model also
has an ethereum wallet which is loaded from an Ethereum
blockchain crypto JSON wallet key-store file to interface
with the ethereum network, and initialize the escrow smart
contracts, upon consumer request, and then deduct the
escrow fee from the transactions between the resource con-
sumer and provider upon completion of the escrow smart
contract. Figure 8, shows a JADE remote agent management
GUI from the proof-of-concept implementation, showing a
contract registrar agent being loaded along with directory
facilitator and other JADE platform agents.
Fig. 8. Authority Node GUI View
4.5 Headless Simulation
Besides the above proof of concept GUIs for each agent, we
ran simulations in headless mode without GUIs to gather
some statistics related to the transactions that occurred on
the trade of resources. The proof of concept experiment ex-
ecutes five instances of resource providers agents imitating
five resource providers. Every agent has his own set of to be
offered resources in the resource pool, along with a different
Ethereum blockchain crypto wallet effectively imitating the
uniqueness of resource providers agent in the ethereum net-
work. Similarly, every resource provider wallet will be deb-
ited once a resource consumer consumes a resource and the
escrow smart contract terminates gracefully. Furthermore,
we ran multiple settings of resource consumers agents in
headless mode. For simplicity first consider the case of one
resource consumer agent in the simulated network whose
job is to imitate hold and consume of a resource for the next
epoch in the simulation, while every other behavior runs
as described in section 3.3. An epoch is a hold period of the
resource was fixed to one hour and after the imitating elapse
of the epoch the resource consumer release the resource and
complete the smart contract, this assumption simplify the
matters for understanding/solving the motivation problem
caused in self-organizing networks.
Table 2 presents the scenario generated by the simulating
a single epoch of a resource consumer vs. five resource
providers. The resource consumer sends a call for proposal
for his required resource to the resource providers in the net-
work. Upon receiving the CFP request each of the providers
will match the request with their resource pool using the
cosine similarity function, and only send in response the
best match back with requested a resource. The best match
with each resource provider according to the requested
posed the consumer is in bold-face at the cosine score col-
umn of Table 2. Once these best match from the individual
resource providers reaches the resource consumer selected
the response of Resource Provider 1 and sends a request to
the contract registrar agent to start an escrow contract and
then put the designated amount of 0.0188 Wei into the smart
escrow contract, and send an accept proposal message to
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TABLE 2
Simulation Trace: Single Resource consumer vs. five Resource providers
Title Wei/hr MIPS3 $ /GB RAM BW (MBPS) CPU Cores Cosine Score
Resource Consumer Randomly requested
t3a.small 0.0188 13800 0.044 2 59 2
Resource Provider 1 Resource Pool
t3a.micro 0.0094 9900 0.352 1 4 2 0.999992503425711
m5.large 0.096 78440 0.04 8 96 2 0.999995336207502
t3.nano 0.0052 7500 0.276 0.5 82 2 0.999977827484931
m5a.large 0.086 65770 0.008 8 57 2 0.999994183623252
t3a.small 0.0188 13800 0.044 2 59 2 1
Resource Provider 2 Resource Pool
m5.xlarge 0.192 147600 0.164 16 72 4 0.999992819700923
m5d.xlarge 0.226 317900 0.38 16 93 4 0.999992055462973
m5.large 0.096 78440 0.04 8 96 2 0.999995336207502
m5a.large 0.086 65770 0.008 8 57 2 0.999994183623252
m5dn.large 0.136 106924 0.204 8 99 2 0.999994380189432
Resource Provider 3 Resource Pool
m4.large 0.1 82300 0.4 8 79 2 0.999994495539404
a1.medium 0.0255 19200 0.26 2 40 1 0.9999975923618
t2.micro 0.0116 10240 0.116 1 31 1 0.999999218978273
t3.nano 0.0052 7500 0.276 0.5 82 2 0.999977827484931
m5d.xlarge 0.226 317900 0.38 16 93 4 0.999992055462973
Resource Provider 4 Resource Pool
t2.micro 0.0116 10240 0.116 1 31 1 0.999999218978273
t3.small 0.0208 14000 0.092 2 55 2 0.999999939860052
t3a.medium 0.0376 27079 0.12 4 35 2 0.999995548858419
a1.large 0.051 49360 0.284 4 100 2 0.999997462590219
m5a.large 0.086 65770 0.008 8 57 2 0.999994183623252
Resource Provider 5 Resource Pool
m5ad.large 0.103 90749 0.048 8 93 2 0.99999470786012
m5d.xlarge 0.226 317900 0.38 16 93 4 0.999992055462973
a1.2xlarge 0.204 238310 0.4 16 68 8 0.999992030759267
t3a.xlarge 0.1504 113093 0.216 16 69 4 0.999993277084396
t3.small 0.0208 14000 0.092 2 55 2 0.999999939860052
the resource provider in question. Upon completion of the
epoch, once the resource consumer releases the resource and
finishes the smart contract, 2% transaction fee is deducted
by the contract registrar agent while the rest is being debited
into the ethereum account of resource provider 1.
Now consider the case of simulating ten epochs of a
resource consumer vs. five resource providers. Where in
every epoch the resource consumer requested a different
resource and after getting the best match resource from the
network likewise, the resource consumer get into a smart
escrow contract with the resource provider providing the
best match resource, and upon completion of the epoch the
resource is released and the amount held by the contract
is transferred to the resource provider. Table 3 presents
the simulation trace of ten epochs wherein each row the
first column presents the simulation epoch. Whereas the
requested resource column presents the resource the con-
sumer requested from the network. The details specification
of these resources is already defined earlier in Table 1.
The winner column specifies the resource provider which
has the best-matched resource for the request. The resource
offered column specifies the resource which is being offered
by the resource provider from its resource pool presented
in Table 2. The Wei column presents the ethereum cryp-
tocurrency amount that was charged for the epoch which
was held by the contract once the consumer starts a contract
and then transferred the balance to the resource provider.
The contract fee column specifies the benefit the contract
registrar gets for every contract. In the ten epochs presented
in Table 3 the total transactions in Wei’s sum up to 1.1119,
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TABLE 3
Simulation Trace: Resource consumer request resource in ten epochs
Epoch RequestedResource Winner
Resource
Offered Wei
Contract
Fee (2%)
1 m5.xlarge ResourceProvider 2 m5.xlarge 0.192 0.00384
2 m5ad.large ResourceProvider 5 m5ad.large 0.103 0.00206
3 m5d.large ResourceProvider 2 m5.xlarge 0.192 0.00384
4 m5.large ResourceProvider 1 m5.large 0.096 0.00192
5 t3.micro ResourceProvider 1 t3a.small 0.0188 0.000376
6 t3.medium ResourceProvider 4 t3a.medium 0.0376 0.000752
7 t2.medium ResourceProvider 2 m5.xlarge 0.192 0.00384
8 a1.medium ResourceProvider 3 a1.medium 0.0255 0.00051
9 m5a.xlarge ResourceProvider 5 a1.2xlarge 0.204 0.00408
10 a1.large ResourceProvider 4 a1.large 0.051 0.00102
Total Wei: 1.1119 0.022238
while the contract registrar agent received a total of 0.022238
Wei as 2% contract fee in each epoch.
Table 3 verify our claim as monetizing the resources
provided by the resource providers, thus, improving their
motivation to join the network, provide services, and get
paid for it. This phenomenon is further explained in the
graph presented as Figure 9. Figure 9 represents each epoch
of Table 3 as x-axis, while the y-axis presents the Wei balance
of a resource provider’s Ethereum crypto wallet, assuming
that in the start of the simulation every resource provider
starts with 0.05 wei balance. Figure 9 visualizes Table 3
presenting the increment in the wallet of resource providers
at every epoch.
Fig. 9. Wei Balance of Resource Providers
As a matter of understanding we have runs multiple
resource consumers and multiple resource providers also in
the simulated test-bed environment. However, for the sake
of simplicity, brevity, and clarity we believe the motivation
problem and its solution is better explained using single
resource consumers and multiple epochs. Thus explaining
how a resource provider gets benefited, as well as the
contract registrar agent also gets benefits, thus opening a
prominent blockchain-based business model.
5 CONCLUSION
This article proposes a blockchain-based incentive man-
agement framework for self-organizing networks. The pro-
posed framework utilizes smart contract and agent-based
methodologies to formalize a decentralized escrow between
the resource consumer and resource provider. This novel
way helps in increasing the motivation of nodes provid-
ing services to the network. Furthermore, the proposed
framework opens a blockchain-based business model for en-
trepreneurs and outlet owners. Lastly, the proposed frame-
work registers a whole new range of research problems to be
studied ranging from a market place to apply auction/game
theory or applying the framework on smart grids, or study-
ing system’s net utility maximization to name a few.
NETWORKING LAB, KYUNG HEE UNIVERSITY, AUG 2020 14
APPENDIX A
ESCROW SMART CONTRACT
This contract is conceptualized and recreated based from on open source Smart Escrow Implementation available at 4. This
smart contract stands true for solidity version 0.6.2 and requires the ethereum virtual machine support for this version of
the contract specification. The source code of the escrow smart contract according to the business logic of our proposed
model is presented as:
1 pragma s o l i d i t y ˆ 0 . 6 . 2 ;
2 import ” ./ SafeMath . s o l ” ;
3 c o n t r a c t Escrow {
4 mapping ( address => uint256 ) p r i v a t e EscrowAccountLedger ;
5 address payable publ ic provider ;
6 address payable publ ic consumer ;
7 address payable publ ic authorityNode ;
8 uint256 publ ic blockNumber ;
9 uint publ ic f e e P e r c e n t ;
10 uint256 publ ic escrowCharge ;
11 bool publ ic providerApproval ;
12 bool publ ic consumerApproval ;
13 bool publ ic providerCancel ;
14 bool publ ic consumerCancel ;
15 uint256 [ ] publ ic depos i t s ;
16 uint256 publ ic feeAmount ;
17 uint256 publ ic providerAmount ;
18 enum EscrowState { u n I n i t i a l i z e d , i n i t i a l i z e d , consumerDeposited ,
19 serviceApproved , escrowComplete , escrowCancelled }
20 EscrowState publ ic EscrowStatus = EscrowState . u n I n i t i a l i z e d ;
21 event Deposit ( address deposi tor , uint256 deposited ) ;
22 event ServicePayment ( uint256 blockNo , uint256 c o n t r a c t B a l a n c e ) ;
23 modif ier onlyConsumer ( ) {
24 i f (msg . sender == consumer ) {
25 ;
26 } e l s e {
27 r e v e r t ( ) ;
28 }
29 }
30 modif ier onlyAuthorityNode ( ) {
31 i f (msg . sender == authorityNode ) {
32 ;
33 } e l s e {
34 r e v e r t ( ) ;
35 }
36 }
37 modif ier checkBlockNumber ( ) {
38 i f ( blockNumber > block . number ) {
39 ;
40 } e l s e {
41 r e v e r t ( ) ;
42 }
43 }
44 modif ier ifApprovedOrCancelled ( ) {
45 i f ( ( EscrowStatus == EscrowState . serviceApproved ) | |
46 ( EscrowStatus == EscrowState . escrowCancelled ) ) {
47 ;
48 } e l s e {
49 r e v e r t ( ) ;
50 }
51 }
52 c o n s t r u c t o r ( ) publ ic {
53 authorityNode = msg . sender ;
54 escrowCharge = 0 ;
55 }
56 f a l l b a c k ( ) e x t e r n a l { // s o l h i n t−disable−l i n e
57 // f a l l b a c k funct ion to disal low any other depos i t s to the c o n t r a c t
58 r e v e r t ( ) ;
59 }
60 funct ion I n i t i a l i z e ( address payable provider , address payable consumer , u int feePercent ,
61 uint256 blockNum ) publ ic payable onlyAuthorityNode {
4. https://github.com/rounakdatta/escrow-dapp/blob/nodejsapp/contracts/escrow.sol
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62 requi re ( ( provider != msg . sender ) && ( consumer != msg . sender ) ) ;
63 provider = provider ;
64 consumer = consumer ;
65 f e e P e r c e n t = feePercent ;
66 blockNumber = blockNum ;
67 EscrowStatus = EscrowState . i n i t i a l i z e d ;
68
69 EscrowAccountLedger [ provider ] = 0 ;
70 EscrowAccountLedger [ consumer ] = 0 ;
71 }
72 funct ion DepositInEscrowByConsumer ( ) publ ic payable checkBlockNumber onlyConsumer {
73 EscrowAccountLedger [ consumer ] = SafeMath . add ( EscrowAccountLedger [ consumer ] , msg . value ) ;
74 depos i t s . push (msg . value ) ;
75 escrowCharge += msg . value ;
76 EscrowStatus = EscrowState . consumerDeposited ;
77 emit Deposit (msg . sender , msg . value ) ; // s o l h i n t−disable−l i n e
78 }
79 funct ion ApproveEscrow ( ) publ ic {
80 i f (msg . sender == provider ) {
81 providerApproval = true ;
82 } e l s e i f (msg . sender == consumer ) {
83 consumerApproval = true ;
84 }
85 i f ( providerApproval && consumerApproval ) {
86 EscrowStatus = EscrowState . serviceApproved ;
87 f e e ( ) ;
88 EscrowPayout ( ) ;
89 emit ServicePayment ( block . number , address ( t h i s ) . balance ) ; // s o l h i n t−disable−l i n e
90 }
91 }
92 funct ion CancelEscrow ( ) publ ic checkBlockNumber {
93 i f (msg . sender == provider ) {
94 providerCancel = true ;
95 } e l s e i f (msg . sender == consumer ) {
96 consumerCancel = true ;
97 }
98 i f ( providerCancel && consumerCancel ) {
99 EscrowStatus = EscrowState . escrowCancelled ;
100 refund ( ) ;
101 }
102 }
103 funct ion EndEscrow ( ) publ ic ifApprovedOrCancelled onlyAuthorityNode {
104 DestructEscrow ( ) ;
105 }
106 funct ion DestructEscrow ( ) i n t e r n a l {
107 s e l f d e s t r u c t ( authorityNode ) ;
108 }
109 funct ion EscrowPayout ( ) p r i v a t e {
110 EscrowAccountLedger [ consumer ] = SafeMath . sub ( EscrowAccountLedger [ consumer ] ,
111 address ( t h i s ) . balance ) ;
112 EscrowAccountLedger [ provider ] = SafeMath . add ( EscrowAccountLedger [ provider ] ,
113 address ( t h i s ) . balance ) ;
114 EscrowStatus = EscrowState . escrowComplete ;
115 providerAmount = address ( t h i s ) . balance ;
116 provider . t r a n s f e r ( address ( t h i s ) . balance ) ;
117 }
118 funct ion f e e ( ) p r i v a t e {
119 uint t o t a l F e e = address ( t h i s ) . balance ∗ ( f e e P e r c e n t / 1 0 0 ) ;
120 feeAmount = t o t a l F e e ;
121 authorityNode . t r a n s f e r ( t o t a l F e e ) ;
122 }
123 funct ion refund ( ) p r i v a t e {
124 consumer . t r a n s f e r ( address ( t h i s ) . balance ) ;
125 }
126 }
NETWORKING LAB, KYUNG HEE UNIVERSITY, AUG 2020 16
REFERENCES
[1] X. Chen, Y. Zhao, and Y. Li, “Qoe-aware wireless video commu-
nications for emotion-aware intelligent systems: A multi-layered
collaboration approach,” Information Fusion, vol. 47, pp. 1–9, 2019.
[2] C. Wu, L. Li, C. Peng, Y. Wu, N. Xiong, and C. Lee, “Design and
analysis of an effective graphics collaborative editing system,”
EURASIP Journal on Image and Video Processing, vol. 2019, no. 1,
p. 50, 2019.
[3] H. Lee, J. Lee, Y. C. Lee, and S. Kang, “Collaboroid: Mobile
platform support for collaborative applications,” Pervasive and
Mobile Computing, vol. 55, pp. 13–31, 2019.
[4] J. C. M. Delgado, “Cloud-based application integration in virtual
enterprises,” in Global Virtual Enterprises in Cloud Computing Envi-
ronments. IGI Global, 2019, pp. 46–85.
[5] S. Di and C. Wang, “Dynamic optimization of multiattribute
resource allocation in self-organizing clouds,” IEEE Transactions on
Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 464–478, March
2013.
[6] R. B. Bohn, C. A. Lee, and M. Michel, “The nist cloud federation
reference architecture,” NIST Special Publication 500-332, 2020.
[7] A. Fox, R. Griffith, A. Joseph, R. Katz, A. Konwinski, G. Lee,
D. Patterson, A. Rabkin, and I. Stoica, “Above the clouds: A berke-
ley view of cloud computing,” Dept. Electrical Eng. and Comput.
Sciences, University of California, Berkeley, Rep. UCB/EECS, vol. 28,
no. 13, p. 2009, 2009.
[8] E. J. Korpela, “Seti@ home, boinc, and volunteer distributed com-
puting,” Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, vol. 40, pp.
69–87, 2012.
[9] V. Buterin et al., “A next-generation smart contract and decentral-
ized application platform,” white paper, 2014.
[10] G. Wood et al., “Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised
transaction ledger,” Ethereum project yellow paper, vol. 151, pp. 1–32,
2014.
[11] D. P. Anderson, “Boinc: A platform for volunteer computing,”
Journal of Grid Computing, pp. 1–24, 2019.
[12] V. D. Cunsolo, S. Distefano, A. Puliafito, and M. Scarpa, “Volunteer
computing and desktop cloud: The cloud@ home paradigm,” in
2009 eighth IEEE international symposium on network computing and
applications. IEEE, 2009, pp. 134–139.
[13] T. Ghafarian, H. Deldari, B. Javadi, M. H. Yaghmaee, and R. Buyya,
“Cycloidgrid: A proximity-aware p2p-based resource discovery
architecture in volunteer computing systems,” Future Generation
Computer Systems, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 1583–1595, 2013.
[14] D. La´zaro, J. M. Marque`s, and X. Vilajosana, “Flexible resource dis-
covery for decentralized p2p and volunteer computing systems,”
in 2010 19th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies:
Infrastructures for Collaborative Enterprises. IEEE, 2010, pp. 235–240.
[15] F. Rossi, T. Ferreto, M. Conterato, P. Souza, W. Marques, R. Cal-
heiros, and G. Rodrigues, “Towards balancing energy savings
and performance for volunteer computing through virtualized
approach,” in CLOSER 2019: Proceedings of the 9th International
Conference on Cloud Computing and Services Science, 2-4 May 2019,
Heraklion, Crete, Greece, 2019, pp. 422–429.
[16] L. Xu, J. Qiao, S. Lin, and W. Zhang, “Dynamic task scheduling
algorithm with deadline constraint in heterogeneous volunteer
computing platforms,” Future Internet, vol. 11, no. 6, p. 121, 2019.
[17] J. Shota, K. Kosuke, S. Sharma, and S. Kouichi, “Simulation of
secure volunteer computing by using blockchain,” in International
Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications.
Springer, 2019, pp. 883–894.
[18] A. Yousafzai, V. Chang, A. Gani, and R. M. Noor, “Directory-
based incentive management services for ad-hoc mobile clouds,”
International Journal of Information Management, vol. 36, no. 6, pp.
900–906, 2016.
[19] J. Edinger, L. M. Edinger-Schons, D. Scha¨fer, A. Stelmaszczyk,
and C. Becker, “Of money and morals-the contingent effect of
monetary incentives in peer-to-peer volunteer computing,” in
Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System
Sciences, 2019.
[20] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,”
Manubot, Tech. Rep., 2019.
[21] S. Poslad, “Specifying protocols for multi-agent systems inter-
action,” ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems
(TAAS), vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 15–es, 2007.
[22] A. FIPA, “Fipa agent management specification,” FIPA TC Agent
Management, vol. SC00023K, 2004.
[23] S. Nakamoto et al., “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash sys-
tem,” 2008.
[24] A. Fipa, “Fipa acl message structure specification,” Founda-
tion for Intelligent Physical Agents, http://www. fipa. org/specs/-
fipa00061/SC00061G. html (30.6. 2004), 2002.
[25] F. Bellifemine, F. Bergenti, G. Caire, and A. Poggi, “Jadea
java agent development framework,” in Multi-agent programming.
Springer, 2005, pp. 125–147.
Abdullah Yousafzai is a postdoctoral research
fellow under the prestigious grant of Brain Korea
21st Century Plus at the department of computer
science and engineering, Kyung Hee University,
Republic of Korea. Previously, he served as an
assistant professor with the department of com-
puter science and engineering, HITEC Univer-
sity, Taxila, Pakistan. Before that, he worked as
a brightspark’s research assistant at C4MCCR
University of Malaysia, and as a backend web
developer in Pakistan. He received his Ph.D.
from the University of Malaya in 2017, MS (Computer Science) from
Comsats Institute of Information Technology, Abbottabad in 2013 and
BCS(Hons) from Hazara University Mansehra, Pakistan in 2009. His
work mainly focuses on distributed computing environments comprising
cloud computing systems, edge computing, mobile cloud computing,
blockchain systems, and the Internet of Things.
Choong Seon Hong [S95, M97, SM11] is
working as a professor with the Department
of Computer Science and Engineering, Kyung
Hee University. His research interests include
future Internet, ad-hoc networks, network man-
agement, and network security. He is a member
of ACM, IEICE, IPSJ, KIISE, KICS, KIPS, and
OSIA. He has served as the General Chair, a
TPC Chair/Member, or an Organizing Commit-
tee Member for international conferences such
as NOMS, IM, APNOMS, E2EMON, CCNC,
ADSN, ICPP, DIM, WISA, BcN, TINA, SAINT, and ICOIN. In addition,
he is currently an associate editor of the IEEE Transactions on Net-
work and Service Management, the International Journal of Network
Management, and the Journal of Communications and Networks and
an associate technical editor of IEEE Communications Magazine.
